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Abstract
We show that estimated productivities of labor and capital which rational-
ize trade ﬂows across countries are related to total factor productivities which
rationalize output diﬀerences across countries. We present evidence that these
productivies from trade ﬂows are related to the institutions and geography
across countries. Protection of property rights is the dominant inﬂuence on
both labor and capital productivity and has similar eﬀects on workers with
only primary education as on those with more education. Geography is only
important in terms of distance to a large market. Evidence concerning democ-
racy is not compelling.
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INTRODUCTION
Factor prices diﬀer widely across countries. For example, the typical manufacturing
worker in the United States is paid roughly ten times more than the average manufac-
turing worker in the Philippines. No doubt the quality and quantity of other inputs
as well as workers’ skills aﬀect workers’ pay. Still, a few simple calculations show that
such diﬀerences cannot possibly account for the diﬀerences in pay. The typical U.S.
worker has about three and a half more years of schooling than the typical Filipino
worker in 2000. Suppose a relatively high return of 10 percent to years of schooling
and that manufacturing production in the U.S. and in the Philippines are character-
ized by a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital and labor with labor’s share
equal to 0.6. Given these assumptions, the U.S. capital stock per worker would have
to be 333 times larger to explain the tenfold diﬀerence in wages. Three hundred and
2thirty-three times larger is very far from the actual ﬁve times larger capital per worker
in the U.S.
Large disparities in relative wages are not particular to this example of the U.S.
and the Philippines. For a set of 80 countries, the average manufacturing wage in the
top ﬁve percent of countries is ten times greater than the median country’s wage and
58 times greater than the average for the bottom ﬁve percent (World Bank 2003). For
the small sample of countries where there are reliable capital estimates of capital’s
returns, capital returns also diﬀer widely across countries. These diﬀerences in factor
returns cannot even remotely be explained by other factors of production.
Over the past decade, many economists have tried to quantify cross-country dif-
ferences in income per person. In all studies, diﬀerences other than physical and
human capital loom large. Hall and Jones (1999) ﬁnd that stocks of physical and
human capital account for only 35 percent of the diﬀerences between the richest
and poorest countries; the remaining 65 percent is due to the residual, total factor
productivity. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) ﬁnd that up to 80 percent of the
cross-country variation in the level of output per worker is due to total factor pro-
ductivity. Over longer horizons, Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) ﬁnd that variation
in the growth of total factor productivity explains from 30 to over 80 percent of the
cross-country diﬀerences in the growth of output per worker. This evidence indicates
that cross-country income diﬀerences are associated with productivity diﬀerences.
Unfortunately, as Abramovitz (1956) puts it, total factor productivity is a measure of
ignorance because little was known about it other than that total factor productivity
makes income diﬀerences consistent with smaller factor endowment diﬀerences.
Over the last ten years, a substantial amount of research also has been devoted to
understanding how income and total factor productivity are aﬀected by institutions
and geography. This research includes, among others, Knack and Keefer (1995),
Sachs and Warner (1995), Barro (1996), Gallup and Sachs with Mellinger (1999),
3Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2004), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). The evidence clearly indicates
that protection of private property rights is important, provides some support for
the importance of democratic institutions, and the evidence concerning geography is
mixed.
While evidence concerning income and total factor productivity is important, in-
stitutions and geography are quite likely to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the returns and
productivity of labor and capital. Knowing how institutions inﬂuence factors’ returns
and productivity is important partly because the eﬀects on factor returns are likely
to be helpful for understanding the development of institutions themselves. While
these points are not new and are mentioned, for example, by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), the only statistical evidence of
w h i c hw ea r ea w a r ei sR o d r i k ’ s( 1 9 9 9 )ﬁnding that more democratic institutions are
associated with higher wages.
In this paper, we estimate the productivity of capital and labor and then examine
the relative importance of institutions and geography for those productivities. We
use the relative factor content of trade to estimate the productivities of capital and
labor across countries.
We start with a standard model of international trade: the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
(HOV) model. In this model of an integrated world, trade in goods is a substitute for
direct trade in factor services or migration of factors and a country is a net exporter
of its relatively abundant good. There have been many empirical tests of the HOV
model which examine the relationship between the observed pattern of trade and
endowments, including among others Maskus (1985) Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskus
(1987), Treﬂer (1993, 1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001). These studies invariably
ﬁnd that the HOV model explains little of trade patterns.
Over half a century ago, Leontief (1953) suggested a possible explanation for the
4HOV model’s poor performance — some countries may use their endowments more
eﬃciently than others. Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987) and Treﬂer (1993,
1995) follow Leontief’s suggestion and allow for productivity diﬀerences in the HOV
model. Treﬂer (1993) shows that factor-augmenting technology can exactly equate
actual trade in factor services and the theoretically implied trade in factor services.
In addition, factor-augmenting technological diﬀerences imply that factor prices can
be equalized relative to productivity. Treﬂer presents evidence that there is a high
correlation between factor payments and his estimates of factor productivity.
Allowing for diﬀerences in factor-augmenting technology may seem appealing, but
these measures of productivity based on trade become a measure of ignorance. As
Feenstra (2004, p. 61) notes,
Even if we accept that the HOV equation can ﬁt perfectly by allowing suf-
ﬁcient diﬀerences in technologies across countries, this begs the question,
where do the diﬀerences come from? .... Such diﬀerences can hardly be
accepted as exogenous, however, and must be explicable based on under-
lying causes. [Emphasis in original.]
This is precisely the same complaint made about total factor productivity.
We show that the measures of factor-augmenting technology obtained from trade
theory, which also can be called measures of factor productivity, are related to total
factor productivity. Theoretically, factor productivity implied by trade is related to
total factor productivity. For example, if the factor productivities from trade theory
indicate that both labor and capital are twice as productive in the U.S. as in the
Philippines, then total factor productivity in the U.S. will be twice as high as total
factor productivity in the Philippines. Despite this theoretical relationship, factor
productivity from the HOV model and the level of total factor productivity are based
on two independent sets of data and the relationship between the two measures is
5an empirical question. Our empirical results indicate that an aggregated measure
of factor-augmented productivity is highly correlated with total factor productivity
from development accounting.
In this paper, we explore the determinants of diﬀerences in factor productivities
across countries. We examine the relationship of factor productivities to institutions
and geography. For most of our results, we measure the extent to which institutions
and geography inﬂuence productivity using two factors of production: physical capital
and eﬀective labor (or human capital). Because a diﬀerential eﬀect on those with
relatively less education is an important and interesting issue, we also examine the
diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions and geography on unskilled and skilled labor based
on education.
Our measures of institutions include measures of countries’ protection of property
rights and levels of democracy. With respect to geography, we consider two ways that
geography inﬂuences factor productivity. First, certain geographic characteristics
reduce productivity because they are associated with an unhealthy climate that is
not conducive to production. Second, geography can limit the extent of the market.
The government’s protection of property rights is highly correlated with factor pro-
ductivity. Democracy generally is positively correlated with both labor and capital
productivity, but this univariate relationship disappears once property rights are in-
cluded in regressions. Geographic variables can account for some of the cross-country
diﬀerences in productivity, but the only geography variable that is robustly correlated
with productivity is minimum distance to a large market. These results continue to
hold when we correct for potential endogeneity of the measures of property rights
and democracy. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of property rights protection on the
productivity of skilled and unskilled workers is similar.
This paper is organized as follows: Section two presents our construction of factor
productivities and related analysis. We summarize HOV theory with and without
6diﬀerences in productivity, discuss the data used in this paper and compare the mea-
sures of capital and labor productivity to each other and to total factor productivity.
In section three, the relationships of capital and labor productivities with institutions
and geography are examined. We also examine the sensitivity of the results to in-
stitutions’ possible endogeneity and present preliminary evidence on whether there
are diﬀerential eﬀects of institutions and geography on skilled and unskilled labor.
Section four concludes.
HOV THEORY AND PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES
In this section, we summarize how HOV theory generates measures of productivity
based on Vanek’s transformation of trade in goods into trades in factor services. Let
i =1 ,...,H index countries, m =1 ,...,M index factors of production and n =1 ,...,N
index industries with M<N .W e d e ﬁne Yi as the N ×1 vector of industry outputs
produced by country i. We assume that countries have identical constant returns to
scale production functions, markets are perfectly competitive, and the world is free
from barriers that distort trade. Each country has an M × 1 vector of endowments
Vi. We assume that world endowments are distributed in such a manner that the
distribution is consistent with an integrated world equilibrium in which all countries
produce all goods, which is suﬃcient to rule out corner solutions.1 We also assume
that the input requirements for producing various industries’ outputs are common
across countries.
I nt h eb a s e l i n eH O Vm o d e l ,t h e r ea r en od i ﬀerences in how eﬃciently factors are
used across countries, and the technology is given by a M × N matrix of common
direct and indirect technology D, where the typical element dm,n is the amount of
1At the level of aggregation used for industries in this paper, there are no countries with zero
production in any industry. This suggests that the conditions for factor price equalization with
productivity diﬀerences are not wildly unrealistic.
7factor m required to produce one unit of good n. Full employment of resources implies
that the vector of factor endowments for country i, Vi =[ v1,i,...,v M,i]
0, is related to
output by Vi = DYi.W ed e ﬁne Ci as an N × 1 vector of domestic expenditure on
ﬁnal goods and services. If people in all countries have identical and homothetic
preferences, country i’s expenditure is proportional to its share of world expenditure,
i.e., Ci = siCw where Cw is the world expenditure vector and si is country i’s share
of world expenditure. Multiplying country i’s expenditure vector by the direct and
indirect input requirement matrix yields DCi = siDCw = siVw where Vw is the M ×1
vector of world endowments. The predicted factor content of trade is factor use
in domestic production, Vi, minus factor use in domestic expenditure on the goods,
siVw. The measured factor content of trade, Fi =[ f1,i,...,fM,i]
0,i st h eM × 1 vector
of implied trade ﬂows of factors, which equals exports minus imports multiplied by
the direct and indirect factor requirements matrix, i.e., Fi = DNX i where NXi is
the N × 1 vector of country i’s net exports.
The correlation between the measured factor content of trade and the predicted
factor content of trade typically is very low. The sign test, one simple test used
to assess the predictions of the HOV model, is the percentage of times that the
measured content of factor m in trade, fm,i =
PN
n=1 dm,nnxn,i,h a st h es a m es i g na s
the predicted content of factor m in trade, b fm,i = vm,i − sivm,w.T h e r e a r e H − 1
independent observations, the Hth being implied by the other H−1 countries because
the shares of expenditure add up to one. The percentage of sign matches typically is
around 50 percent, indicating that the HOV prediction is no better than a ﬂip of a
coin.2
Treﬂer (1993) allows for international diﬀerences in factor productivity. He deﬁnes
πm,i as the factor augmenting technology for factor m in country i, which also can
2Maskus (1985) termed the consistently poor performance of the of the HOV model the ”Leontief
commonplace” as opposed to the ”Leontief paradox”.
8be called the productivity of factor m in country i. The predicted factor content
of trade for factor m by country i adjusted for diﬀerences in productivity is b fm,i =
πm,ivm,i − si
PH
i0=1 πm,i0vm,i0 in which the πm,i’s are unknowns. Given the singularity
due to the expenditure shares summing to one, the U.S. productivity for each factor
can be normalized to one. If the predicted and actual factor contents of trade are
equated, i.e. fm,i = b fm,i,t h e r ea r eH − 1 unknowns πm,i and H − 1 linear equations
for each factor m, fm,i = πm,ivm,i −si
PH
i0=1 πm,i0vm,i0, where πm,US =1 .I ti sp o s s i b l e
to solve exactly for these unknown factor productivities πm,i that exactly “predict” or
“explain” the factor content of trade. As Treﬂer shows, the estimates of productivity
for a factor are independent of mismeasurement of the quantities of other factors and
their productivities.
Data
As in other HOV studies, the data used in this study are drawn from a variety of
sources. Unless otherwise noted, all data are for 84 countries in 1997 based on 32
industries of traded goods. Appendix Tables 1 and 2 list the countries and industries.3
The data on trade ﬂows are from Feenstra (2000.)
Our primary estimates use data on two factors of production: the capital stock
and the labor force measured in eﬀective labor units. The capital stock measures
are constructed using the perpetual inventory method with an annual depreciation
rate of 13.3 percent (Leamer 1984) using real investment data from Baier, Dwyer,
and Tamura (2006). Aggregate labor force data are converted into eﬀective labor
force units by multiplying the labor force by exp(ϕ(educi,exper i)) where educi is the
number of years of schooling for the average worker in country i, experi is the average
3Data are available to estimate trade productivities for 91 countries, but the insitutional infor-
mation used in the later regressions is not available for seven of them, which leaves the 84 countries
listed in Appendix Table 1.
9level of experience in country i and exp(ϕ(educi,exper i)) reﬂects returns to education
and experience.4 Data on the labor force are from the World Bank (2002) and data
on education are from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006).
For some of our analysis, labor is divided into skill categories based on education.
Data on education are multiplied by the labor force in each country to arrive at
the number of workers with some primary education — called “unskilled workers”
and those with at least some education beyond the primary level — called “skilled
workers”. Because we do not know the average education of workers who attended
only primary school, calculating these measures of labor based on education comes
at the expense of not being able to measure labor in eﬀective labor.
Construction of the direct and indirect input requirement matrix is standard (Bowen,
Leamer and Sveikauskas 1987). Input requirements are based on the 1997 input-
output tables for the United States. The stocks of capital by industry in the U.S.
are from the U.S. series “ﬁx e dr e p r o d u c i b l et a n g i b l ew e a l t h . ”T oe q u a t et h et o t a l
of these capital stocks and our computed U.S. perpetual-inventory aggregate capi-
tal stock, the capital stock in each industry is multiplied by the ratio of the U.S.
perpetual-inventory aggregate capital stock to the total of the U.S. capital stocks
from ﬁxed reproducible tangible wealth. This results in a sum of the capital stocks
by industry in the U.S. equal to our estimate of the aggregate U.S. capital stock.
Data for the U.S. labor force employed in each sector are from the National Income
and Product Accounts of the United States and the Bartelsman and Gray (2002)
productivity database for 1997. The total labor force is adjusted to equal the World
4The derivatives of ϕ(educi,experi) are the returns to an additional year of schooling or experience
that can be estimated from Mincerian wage regressions. As in Hall and Jones (1999), Debaere and
Demiroglu (2003) and Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006), we assume that the return to education
for the ﬁrst four years of schooling is 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent for the second four years and 6.8
percent for all years of education above the 8th year. As in Bils and Klenow (2000), we assume the
return to experience is quadratic.
10Bank’s estimate of the U.S. labor force (World Bank 2002). Data on workers’ average
education by industry for the U.S. are from the 1990 Census (Ruggles, Sobek et al.
2003). Income per capita and population are from the World Bank (2002). Each
country’s share of world consumption is its share of absorption of goods and services
in all countries.
HOV Estimates
Baseline HOV Results for Trade.–
T h ea s s u m p t i o n si nt h eb a s e l i n eH O Vm o d e l in which technology is assumed to be
t h es a m ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e sa r e
Assumption 1. In each country, factors are mobile across sectors and factor markets clear.
Assumption 2. Tastes can be represented by homothetic preferences that are the same across
countries, which implies that each country’s consumption of each good is pro-
portional to its share of world consumption; that is, Ci = siCw.
Assumption 3. Each country has access to the same technology.
Assumption 4. The distribution of the endowment of factors is such that world trade is consis-
tent with an integrated world equilibrium in which each ﬁnal good is produced
by every country.
We focus on one implication of the model, namely
Proposition 1. The predicted factor content of trade is b fm,i = vm,i − sivm,w and the actual
factor content of trade is fm,i = DmNXi.
If factor markets are perfectly competitive, it also follows that
Proposition 2. Factor price equalization holds, i.e., wm,i = wm,i0 where wm,i is the return to
factor m in country i.
11A weak implication of the HOV hypothesis is that country i should export the
services of its relatively abundant factor and import the services of its relatively
scarce factor, which implies that b fm,i T 0 as fm,i T 0, an implication that can be
examined by a sign test. The sign test tabulates the percentage of times that the
signs of b fm,i and fm,i are the same. The percentage of observations for which the
actual and predicted eﬀective labor and capital content of trade have the same sign
is 47.8 percent. The HOV model performs worse than a ﬂip of a coin!5 If we attach
more weight to observations with a larger factor content of trade as in Treﬂer (1995),
this weighted statistic is 63.5 percent — an improvement but still a far cry from one
hundred percent.6 Allowing for cross-country diﬀerences in productivity weakens the
model’s assumptions.
HOV Estimates of Productivities.–
As does Treﬂer (1993), we allow productivity to diﬀer by country and by factor.
Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 of the baseline model are the same. However, Assumption 3
becomes
Assumption 30. Technology can diﬀer by country and by factor.
This assumption and Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 imply
Proposition 1’: The actual factor content of trade fm,i is identically equal to the predicted factor
content of trade b fm,i = πm,ivm,i − si
PH
i=1 πm,ivm,i with πm,US =1 .
If factor markets are perfectly competitive,
5Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskus (1987), Treﬂer (1993, 1995) and Davis and Weinstein (2001)
report similar results.
6The results are similar if labor is measured in terms of the number of workers rather than in
terms of eﬀective labor. The percent with the correct sign is 47.8 percent using the number of
workers. The percentage correct increases to 64.2 percent if the observations are weighted by their
factor content of trade.
12Proposition 2’: Factor price equalization holds in terms of eﬀective labor, i.e., wm,i = πm,iwm,US.
Treﬂer (1993) examined the plausibility of the model by comparing relative factor
returns, wm,i/wm,US, to the relative productivities, πm,i. He found a good ﬁt between
these relative factor returns and the relative productivities.7 Gabaix (1997) calcu-
lates the productivity by factor types assuming zero trade and shows little diﬀerence
between these productivities and the productivities when trade is included in the
calculation. Algebra similar to Gabaix’s with U.S. productivity normalized to unity
implies that the productivity of factor m in country i relative to U.S. productivity















where TC i is total domestic expenditure on ﬁnal goods and services in country i.
If total domestic expenditure is approximately equal to Gross Domestic Product,
then the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side indicates that relative productivities are
related to the relative average product. Because of diminishing returns, it would be
hard to imagine a world in which factor returns are orthogonal to average products.
Trade can weaken this relationship, but average products are likely to be of ﬁrst-
order importance in determining productivities. Holding constant average product, a
country’s relative productivity is higher if the country is an exporter of that factor’s
services.8 The larger the factor content of trade relative to the endowment, the higher
is measured relative productivity. It is also easy to see why the factor content of
7U s i n gad i ﬀerent methodology, Repetto and Ventura (1997) ﬁnd that, while factor prices do
reﬂect diﬀerences in factor-augmenting productivity, disparities exist in relative factor prices even
after taking into account diﬀerences in productivity. Because of the data requirements for their
tests, they have a relatively small sample size and their estimates are imprecise.
8In our data, the average estimates of the productivities are ten percent diﬀerent with trade
than without trade, indicating that the trade data are adding information to the information in the
technology matrix.
13trade is scaled by the endowment. If a country is a net exporter of a factor’s service
a n di t se n d o w m e n to ft h a tf a c t o ri ss m a l l ,t h a tf a c t o rm u s tb er e l a t i v e l yp r o d u c t i v e .
The third term enters with a minus sign because, everthing else the same, a country’s
relative productivity compared to the US is lower if the US is a net exporter of that
factor’s service. For the same reason that the factor content of trade is measured
relative to a country’s endowment, If the U.S. is a net exporter of a factor’s service
and its endowment of that factor is relatively small, that factor must be relatively
productive in the U.S. The third term also is scaled by country i’s size relative to the
U.S.
Figure 1 shows estimates of aggregate labor and capital productivities by country.
The vertical axis is the country’s capital productivity and the horizontal axis is the
country’s labor productivity. The line in the ﬁgure is the line indicating equality of
capital and labor productivity. The ﬁgure shows that countries with high measured
labor productivity tend to have high measured capital productivity, but the relation-
ship between these two measures is far from perfect. The correlation between the two
measures is 0.58. We ﬁnd that the mean level of capital productivity is higher than
the mean level of labor productivity, and there is less dispersion of capital productiv-
ity than labor productivity. This is not too surprising to us. If capital is more mobile
than labor, then returns to capital will be more similar across countries. There are a
few countries that have high capital productivities relative to their labor productivity
and to their GDP, for example Angola. This high capital productivity may be due to
the endowments of natural resources — e.g., diamonds and oil in Angola.
HOV Productivity and Total Factor Productivity
What is the correlation of these measures of factor productivity based on trade
with other measures of aggregate productivity? We compare the factor-augmenting
productivity from Treﬂer’s approach to the estimate of productivity from development
14accounting.
In the growth literature, factor endowments account for little of the cross-country
diﬀerences in income per worker. Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (1997) and Hall
and Jones (1999) are two recent papers that emphasize this, ﬁnding that much of
cross-country diﬀerences in output per worker are due to diﬀerences in total factor
productivity. They calculate total factor productivity from an aggregate production
function. Let yi be output per worker in country i. With Cobb-Douglas production,






where Ai, ki, and hi, are total factor productivity, capital per worker and human
capital per worker in country i. Total factor productivity in country i relative to













This relative total factor productivity can be compared to productivity estimated
from the factor content of trade. A simple way to aggregate the capital and labor
productivities from trade theory is to take a geometric average of the capital and




 ,i , with the weight on capital’s productivity equal
to its share of income. We set capital’s share of income η to 0.33, a value consistent
with Gollin’s (2002) careful cross-country study of income shares. Figure 2 shows
that there is a substantial positive relationship between the geometric average of the
trade productivities and relative total factor productivity. Total factor productivity
and the weighted average of trade productivities do not lie along the line in the ﬁgure
showing equality, but the correlation between the measure of relative productivity
from the factor content of trade and relative total factor productivity is 0.876. This
indicates that the two measures of productivity derived from largely independent data
15are quite similar.9
PRODUCTIVITY, GEOGRAPHY, AND INSTITUTIONS
What country-speciﬁc factors are related to these measures of relative productiv-
ity? We focus on the correlations of factors’ productivities with geography, property
rights protection and democratic government. We separate the potential inﬂuence
of geography on productivity into “productive geography,” which aﬀects productivity
through geographic characteristics, and “market geography,” which aﬀects productiv-
ity through access to large markets and the ability to specialize and exploit economies
of scale. Then we describe the measures of property rights and democracy.
Initially, we report the R2 from separate regressions of the productivity measures on
productive geography, market geography, property rights protection, and democracy.
These are followed by regressions that include diﬀerent subsets of these four possible
inﬂuences on productivity. Causality and correlation, of course, are not the same
thing. It is likely, though, that a country’s geographic characteristics are exogenous
relative to factor productivity in the country. Property rights and democracy, on the
other hand, could be as much a result as a cause of factor productivity. In the last part
of this section, we present some instrumental-variables estimates of the relationship
of productivity with property rights and democracy.
The data on geography are from Gallup and Sachs with Mellinger (1999). The
measure of protection of property rights is from Hall and Jones (1998, 1999). The
data on democracy are based on the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2004) that
9If productivity diﬀerences are assumed to be only labor augmenting as in Hall and Jones (1999),
the correlation of relative total factor productivity and the total relative trade productivity is 0.89.
We also performed a grid search allowing capital’s share to vary between 0.01 and 0.99. The
highest correlation between the aggregated trade productivities and total factor productivity is
0.876 to three digits, which is the value with capital’s share ranging from 0.31 to 0.40.
16update the Polity III data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The data on legal origin are
from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
Geography
Geography can aﬀect productivity directly by limiting the productivity of resources
due to characteristics associated with its geographic location or indirectly by limiting
the extent of the market and the ability of factors to specialize and achieve economies
of scale.
The tropics seem like paradise with an abundance of sun, vegetation and food, but
the reality can be quite diﬀerent. Diet often has limited variety and the seemingly
desirable characteristics of the tropics can foster diseases that can reduce the produc-
tion of goods and services (Gallup and Sachs with Mellinger 1999). With abundant
rainfall and no frost, the tropics are breeding grounds for diseases and the diseases’
carriers.10 To lessen illness and death, resources can be allocated to prevent and
treat diseases, but this implies that smaller quantities of other goods and services are
produced. Such use of resources acts eﬀectively as a tax on non-disease-preventing
production in the area. We use latitude and the fraction of the population with
malaria to measure these adverse eﬀects of tropical diseases.
More obviously than the tropics, deserts are inhospitable environments that can
be associated with lower output. Deserts have little precipitation, high winds, poor
soil and extreme temperatures. All of these characteristics make capital and labor
less productive by making the production of many goods more costly. To estimate
the eﬀect of desert climate on productivity, we use desert area in tropical latitudes
relative to total land in each country and desert area in temperate latitudes relative
10The most notable pests are the Anopheles mosquito which spreads malaria and the tsetse ﬂy
which spreads sleeping sickness (African trypanosomiasis).
17to total land in each country, as do Gallup and Sachs with Mellinger (1999).11 In sum,
the productive geography hypothesis suggests that countries located in less temperate
zones (lower latitudes) with a higher prevalence of malaria and countries with a higher
fraction of land covered by desert have less productive capital and labor.
Figure 3 shows the relationships between productive geography and labor and cap-
ital productivity. The “productive geography” shown in the panels of the ﬁgure are
the ﬁtted values of labor and capital productivity from the productive geographic
factors: latitude, desert, and fraction of the population with malaria. By itself, pro-
ductive geography explains 42 percent of the variation in labor productivity and six
percent of the variation in capital productivity. For labor productivity, latitude and
the fraction of the population aﬄicted by malaria are statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level but neither desert variable is statistically signiﬁcant.12 For capital
productivity, only the fraction of land that is tropical desert is statistically signiﬁcant
at the ﬁve percent level.
A country’s location can aﬀect the size of the economic market and the economy’s
ability to specialize and achieve economies of scale. Countries that have small local
markets, are far away from large markets, and do not have access to water transport
may not be able to specialize and exploit economies of scale as much as others. We
test this market geography hypothesis by four variables: 1. the logarithm of land
area; 2. the proximity to large markets by the logarithm of the minimum great-circle
11Extremely cold environments also have undesirable characteristics, but few people live in such
areas, e.g. above the Artic Circle. Perhaps this explains why there are no estimated eﬀects of very
cold climates in the published literature.
12Because malaria can be a result as well as a cause of low income or low productivity, we use
the incidence of malaria in 1966 to lessen any endogeneity of the incidence of malaria relative to the
1997 estimates of productivity.
We also examined whether absolute distance from the equator aﬀects growth and found empirical
results qualitatively similar to those presented.
18distance to Tokyo, Rotterdam, or New York; 3. the cost of moving goods into and
out of a country by a dummy variable equal to one if the country is landlocked; and
4. the fraction of land that is within 100 kilometers of the coast.
Figure 4 shows the relationships between market geography and labor and capital
productivity. By itself, market geography explains 43 percent of the variation in labor
productivity and eleven percent of the variation in capital productivity. Distance from
large markets is the only variable that is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent
level, with the productivity of both labor and capital falling as the distance to a large
market increases.
Property Rights and Democracy
In addition to geographic factors, the productivity of factors of production is likely
to be aﬀected by the institutions in a country. The two institutions that we investigate
in this paper are protection of private property rights and the democratic selection
of government oﬃcials.
Why would protection of property rights aﬀect labor and capital productivity?
In the absence of protection of property rights, individuals face two types of risks.
First, if individuals fear government expropriation, they will try to hide their assets
to decrease the probability of government expropriation, which can decrease the ef-
ﬁciency of production. For example, the possibility of expropriation can be reduced
by building smaller-than-optimal production facilities that are not as readily obvious
or ﬁxed in place (de Soto 2000). Second, as suggested by Tullock (1967) and elabo-
rated by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), Acemoglu (1995), and Grossman and
Kim (1995), some individuals may choose to attempt to steal from those who pro-
duce goods and services, and those who produce goods will use resources to protect
themselves from the predators. Eﬀective protection of private property rights that
decreases theft will result in resources being allocated to more productive uses.
19We quantify the government’s protection of property rights by the same measure
used by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999), which is based on
ﬁve components from the International Country Risk Guide and available from Hall
and Jones (1998). The ﬁrst two components measure the role of government in
protecting against predatory private behavior through the rule of law and bureaucratic
quality. The other three components measure the government as a possible diverter
of resources by measures of government corruption, risk of expropriation, and the
government’s repudiation of contracts. We use a somewhat arbitrary equally weighted
average of these ﬁve measures. The relationships between these measures of the
protection of property rights and labor and capital productivity are shown in Figure
5. The government’s protection of property rights explains 69 percent of the cross-
country variation in labor productivity and 22 percent of the cross-country variation
in capital productivity.
The eﬀect of democratic government on productivity is not obvious. More demo-
cratic societies can winnow out bad laws and ineﬃcient leaders, eﬀects which would
tend to raise productivity. In this case, political and economic freedom are mutually
reinforcing, a point emphasized by Friedman (1962, Ch. 1). On the other hand,
people may vote for income redistribution and make the economy less eﬃcient, with
the relationship between redistribution and the wealth distribution not necessarily
obvious (Peltzman 1980).
To measure democracy, we follow a procedure similar to Rodrik (1999), classifying
Jaggers and Gurr’s (1995) updated Polity IV measures (Marshall and Jaggers 2004)
into two equally weighted groups, Categories A and B, and then using an equally
weighted average of these groups.
Category A is an equally weighted average of six measures of institutionalized
democracy, four of which reﬂect the selection and the accountability of the executive
a n dt w oo fw h i c hr e ﬂect the expression of political opinions. Category A’s measures
20of institutional democracy include 1. the existence of institutionalized procedures
for the transfer of executive power; 2. the extent to which subordinates have equal
opportunity to become superordinates; 3. the choice of the executive by election, a
dual process in which one oﬃce is elected and the other is hereditary, or by hereditary
alone; 4. the extent to which decisions made by the executive are accountable to other
authorities; 5. whether, when and how policy preferences can be expressed; and 6.
whether alternative preferences for policy leadership can be expressed. Category A
is an equally weighted ten-year average in which all components are normalized from
zero to one, with higher values indicating more democracy.
Category B measures the extent to which the political process is open to the general
population. The two components contained in Category B are 1. the extent to which
political expression is suppressed or curtailed and 2. the extent to which citizens can
express political preferences, civil liberties are guaranteed, and people can participate
in the political process. Both scores are normalized from zero to one with a higher
score indicating a more democratic regime. Category B is a ten-year equally weighted
average of these components.
The overall measure of democracy is an equally weighted average of the Category
A and Category B measures of democracy. Diﬀerent weighting schemes yield quanti-
tatively similar results for the measure of democracy.
There is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship of both labor and capital
productivity with this measure of democracy, which explains 39 percent of the cross-
country variation in labor productivity and nine percent of the cross-country variation
in capital productivity. Figure 6 shows the relationship of this measure of democracy
with labor and capital productivities.
21Productivity, Geography and Institutions — OLS Estimates
In this section, we allow the measures of geography and institutions to enter into
a regression speciﬁcation simultaneously to identify which variables appear to be
robustly correlated with productivity.13
Table 1 shows the estimated coeﬃcients in OLS regressions for labor and capital
productivity.14 Property rights are statistically signiﬁcant and highly correlated with
labor productivity in all speciﬁcations in Table 1. On the other hand, democracy is
not statistically signiﬁcant in any regressions that include property rights. The only
geographic variable that is robustly related to labor productivity is the logarithm of
the minimum distance to a large market.15
The regression results are very similar for capital productivity. Property rights are
signiﬁcantly related to capital productivity. Democracy, on the other hand, is not
statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level in any of the six regressions that in-
clude property rights as a right-hand side variable. There is some evidence that the
logarithm of the minimum distance to a major market is related to capital produc-
tivity.
The apparent insigniﬁcance of democracy could be due to using a rather arbitrarily
equally weighted index of aspects of democracy, some of which are important and
some of which are not. To examine this issue, we test whether the equally weighted
index is consistent with the data. The Category B components are so collinear that
13The results are similar for log-linear estimates and fractional logit (Papke and Wooldridge 1996)
speciﬁcations. Since it is not obvious which is the correct functional form, a simple functional
form test of the log-linear speciﬁcation compared to the levels speciﬁcation revealed that the levels
speciﬁcation explains a higher fraction of the variation for capital, labor, and skilled and unskilled
productivitites.
14The reported standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
15Latitude is statistically signiﬁcant only if the logarithm of the minimum distance to a major
market is not included in the regressions.
22separate estimation is not feasible, and we examine only the Category A components
separately. In the speciﬁcation including all variables, an F-test for equating the six
coeﬃcients of the Category A components has a p-value of 93 percent and the R2
increases only from 0.75 to 0.77. For the same regression for capital productivity,
however, the R2 increases from 0.33 to 0.40 when the components are entered sep-
arately and the p-value is 4 percent. The restriction imposed on the coeﬃcients is
marginally statistically signiﬁcant but none of the individual estimated coeﬃcients
is statistically signiﬁcant, quite possibly indicative of multicollinearity. Somewhat
surprisingly, these tests suggest that the individual components of democracy are
unimportant for labor productivity but are important for capital productivity. They
also indicate that teasing any such possible relations from the data is likely to be
complicated by correlations among the components. We do not pursue this line of
research in this paper but discuss its implications in the conclusion.
Even though not statistically signiﬁcant, the point estimates still could indicate
that geography is economically important compared to institutions. We estimate the
economic importance of geography and institutions by calculating whether a country
would have higher productivity with the United Kingdom’s geographic position or
with its institutions.16 The United Kingdom has attractive geographic features: direct
access to the ocean, relatively short distances to large markets, low incidence of
malaria, almost no desert, and a location in a relatively temperate zone. The United
Kingdom also has relatively high scores on property rights and democracy. The
property rights index is 0.933 compared to a mean of 0.624 and a median of 0.571
and the democracy index is 0.902 compared to a mean of 0.614 and a median of
16Here, we are assuming the costs of switching geographic positions and institutions are zero
and that institutions are independent of geography. Obviously, the costs of changing geography
and institutions are far from zero. Institutions may well depend partly on geography (Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 2003).
230.657.17 We compare the Philippines to the United Kingdom using the regressions for
labor and capital productivity in Table 1 that include all variables. If the Philippines
kept its institutions but had the United Kingdom’s geography, the Philippines’ labor
productivity would increase from seven percent to 28 percent of the U.S.’s and capital
productivity would increase from 25 percent to 26 percent of the U.S.’s. On the other
hand, if the Philippines were to keep its physical position and adopted the same
institutions as the United Kingdom, labor productivity would increase from seven
percent to 75 percent and capital productivity would increase from 25 percent to 58
percent. In short, the Philippines’ geography which, practically speaking is almost
entirely exogenous to the Philippines, has far less eﬀect on the Philippines’ labor and
capital productivities than does its protection of property rights and governance. The
Philippines is hardly unique.
Consider Ethiopia, a country at roughly the same latitude as the Philippines but
with other geographic characteristics that are worse than those of the Philippines —
a much higher incidence of malaria, no port, and a location farther from large mar-
kets. A move to the United Kingdom’s geographic position would increase Ethiopia’s
labor productivity from two percent to 33 percent and capital productivity from 25
percent to 35 percent. If Ethiopia adopted the United Kingdom’s institutions, labor
productivity would increase from two percent to 74 percent and capital productivity
would increase from 25 percent to 61 percent.
Table 2 presents the results of this analysis by quintiles based on the countries’
labor and capital productivities, with the numbers in the table being the mean of
the values in each quintile. This table shows that adopting the United Kingdom’s
institutions uniformly has a bigger impact on productivity than does its geography. If
all countries could move to the United Kingdom’s geographic position, average labor
17For comparison, the property rights index for the United States is 0.947 and the democracy
index is 0.902.
24productivity in the middle quintile would increase from 17 percent of the U.S.’s level
to 36 percent. On the other hand, if the world were to adopt the United Kingdom’s
institutions, labor productivity in the middle quintile would increase to 66 percent of
the U.S.’s level. The U.K.’s geography would increase the middle quintile’s capital
productivity by a trivial amount, but the U.K.’s institutions would increase it by 25
percentage points to 73 percent.
While better geography would help people in the Philippines, Ethiopia and in much
of the rest of the world, better institutions would help them quite a bit more. These
results are similar to those in Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).18 Our results
also indicate that protection of property rights is more important than democracy.19
Institutions clearly can increase the relative well being of both workers and owners of
physical capital, even given a disadvantageous location. Our estimates indicate that
18This conclusion is not sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the regressions. An ad hoc speciﬁcation
search is not particularly informative, although it can provide an indication of the sensitivity of
results to speciﬁcation. To this end, we ran all possible regressions of labor and capital productivity
on any ﬁve of the ten variables. Property rights were statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level
in all 126 regressions for labor productivity including property rights and in 56 of the 126 regressions
for capital productivity including property rights. With property rights included, democracy was
not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the 56 regressions for each productivity. With property rights
included, the only geography variables that are statistically signiﬁcant in more than four regressions
for either labor or capital productivity are distance to a major market for labor productivity and
latitude for capital productivity; distance to a major market is statistically signiﬁcant in 32 of
the 56 regressions for labor productivity that include property rights and distance, and latitude
is statistically signiﬁcant in 18 of the 56 regressions for capital productivity that include property
rights and latitude.
19As another measure of government eﬃciency, there are 2002 data on government regulation from
the World Bank (2004). If the cross-sectional variation of this variable has changed little with time,
these variable for 2002 are additional measures of government eﬃciency and may be related to 1997
productivity diﬀerences. As with democracy, these variables have little or no explanatory power
once property rights are included in the regressions.
25the Philippines and Ethiopia still would not be as wealthy as the United Kingdom
or the United States if they had better protection of property rights, but better
protection of property rights would make their wealth dramatically higher than it
is. The policy implications of these observations are far from immediate (Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi 2004, pp. 157-58), but they indicate a direction for further
analysis.
Robustness to Endogeneity and Measurement Error
There are several reasons why the coeﬃcients on the above estimates might be
biased or inconsistent and, therefore, inaccurately reﬂect how institutions aﬀect pro-
ductivity and factor returns. The results may be sensitive to the speciﬁcation of
individual regressions. Causality may run from productivity to institutions; if more
productive countries choose better institutions, the importance of institutions may be
overstated. On the other hand, the index measures are noisy measures of institutions
and these coeﬃcients may suﬀer from the classic errors in variables bias toward zero.
To examine the importance of reverse causality and measurement error, we use
instrumental variables for the institutional variables. The instruments are 1. the
legal origin of a country, a set of dummy variables divided into alternatives of English,
French, German and Scandinavian, Spanish and Socialist, 2. a dummy variable equal
to one if a country ever had a Communist government, 3. a measure of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization that measures the likelihood that two randomly matched people in
a country speak the same language, and 4. the productive and market geography
variables.
Table 3 reports the results from the instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Prop-
erty rights remain robustly related to labor productivity and the coeﬃcient estimates
are higher than in OLS regressions. The ev i d e n c ef o rt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fp r o p e r t y
rights for capital productivity is weaker than in the OLS regressions. Even so, the
26measure of property rights is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level in all
but one of the IV speciﬁcations, and the democracy index never is statistically signif-
icant. As before, the distance to a large market is the only geographic variable that
is robustly related to labor productivity. There also is some evidence that distance
to a large market is related to capital productivity.
Productivity of Skilled and Unskilled Workers
T h ee v i d e n c ea b o v ei n d i c a t e st h a tp r o t e c t i o no fp r o p e r t yr i g h t sb e n e ﬁts both work-
ers and owners of capital, but the evidence could be consistent with unskilled workers
losing out. We measure labor in terms of eﬀective labor units and examine how in-
stitutions aﬀect a worker with the average years of schooling and experience in that
country. How do geography and institutions aﬀect the productivity of workers with
diﬀerent skill levels?
To provide an initial answer to this question, we divide the labor force into workers
with at most primary education and those who have completed some secondary or
higher education. A practical problem arises because the Baier, Dwyer and Tamura
(2006) data include no information on the years of schooling completed by workers
who only completed primary school. As a result, these measures of productivity for
unskilled and skilled workers are not for eﬀective labor based on average education.
Instead, they are the productivity of workers who have completed at most primary
school and the productivity of workers who have completed more schooling.
Table 4 presents the regressions for the workers with no more than primary ed-
ucation and those with more education. This table shows that property rights are
more closely related to the productivity of both sets of workers than is geography.
As before, the only geographic variable consistently associated with productivity is
the logarithm of the minimum distance to a major market. The coeﬃcient estimates
suggest that better protection of property rights raises the productivity of skilled
27w o r k e r sm o r et h a nt h ep r o d u c t i v i t yo fw o r k e r sw i t hl e s se d u c a t i o n . A tl e a s tw i t h -
out controlling for endogeneity, it seems to be the case that more property rights
protection beneﬁts skilled workers more then unskilled workers.
The diﬀerential eﬀect for skilled and unskilled workers disappears when instrumen-
tal variables are used for property rights protection and for democracy. Table 5 shows
the estimated equations using instrumental variables. The coeﬃcient on property
rights is statistically diﬀerent for skilled workers compared to unskilled workers only
in the ﬁrst equation with property rights and the market geography variables.
The apparent diﬀerence between the OLS and IV estimates may be explicable,
perhaps being consistent with an exogenous eﬀect of property rights and endogenous
feedback that increases workers’ education. Suppose that an exogenous increase in
property rights protection occurs. By hypothesis, this will lead to an increase in the
returns to both skilled and unskilled labor. This increases the accumulation of hu-
man capital, because returns to it have increased. Consequently, average education
increases and there is an increase in the actual education of those who have completed
more than primary school. While the average education of those with primary edu-
cation also would increase, the low upper bound for primary education is consistent
with a smaller eﬀect on their average education. As a result, OLS using the number
o fw o r k e r sw i t ha tm o s tp r i m a r ye d u c a t i o na n dt h o s ew i t hm o r ei n d i c a t e sag r e a t e r
eﬀect of property rights on skilled workers’ productivity because the OLS estimate
includes this endogenous increase in years of schooling completed.
We conclude that these results provide no support for concerns that protecting
property rights favors one class of workers over another class of workers. In fact, the
correlation between low skill productivity and income per worker is positive, 0.80.20
20Caselli and Coleman (2004) ﬁnd a negative relationship between the productivity of unskilled
workers and output per worker. In their framework, countries choose "appropriate technology";
that is, they can adopt and employ technologies that make one type of workers more productive, but
28CONCLUSION
In the trade literature, there has been little work done to explain cross-country
diﬀerences in productivities from Treﬂer’s modiﬁcation of the HOV model. We show
that the measures of productivity based on the HOV model are highly correlated
with productivity estimated by development accounting. Hence, our research ties the
productivities based on trade into the literature on total factor productivity, which
has substantial evidence on the eﬀects of institutions and geography on economic
growth.
We ﬁnd little evidence that geography is reliably associated with productivity,
especially in terms of climate and related factors. We do ﬁnd that distance from a
large market has a consistent eﬀect on productivity, but this eﬀect is of secondary
importance compared to institutions.
We ﬁnd that more protection of private property rights is correlated with higher
productivity of capital and labor and that the higher productivity of labor reﬂects
higher productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers. Once property rights are
included in the estimated equations, the overall democracy index plays little direct
role in inﬂuencing factor productivity. This conclusion is the same as that reached
by many others, as the summary by Gerring, Bond and Barndt (2004) indicates. On
the other hand, we ﬁnd that the restriction of the democracy index to an equally
weighted average is inconsistent with the data for capital productivity. If all of the
coeﬃcients on the individual components were zero, an equally weighted average of
unimportant factors would be as good as any other weighted average of the compo-
nents. For capital productivity, the restriction to an equally weighted average has
a p-value of 4 percent, statistically signiﬁcant and therefore marginally inconsistent
this comes at the expense of making the other type less productive. In our framework, there is no
trade-oﬀ between the productivity of worker types and the correlation can be positive or negative.
29with no eﬀect of any component. Unfortunately, there is substantial correlation of
the various components. Sorting out whether the statistical signiﬁcance is happen-
stance or indicative of an interesting relationship is not trivial. Gerring, Bond and
Barndt (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) present interesting evidence on
possible links of political organization and economic growth. We currently are pur-
suing this issue with more data over a longer period. In the meantime, it can be said
that private property rights are important, and it is uncertain whether democratic
institutions aﬀect productivity independently of property rights.
Beyond this important issue, there are numerous directions that can be pursued
to clarify the eﬀect of institutions on productivity. Important questions are how
quickly institutional change translates into changes in measured productivity and
quantifying whether institutions have an eﬀect on factor returns independent of the
eﬀect on productivity, as Rodrik (1999) suggests. Embedding trade into a model in
which there is corruption as in Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) or Anderson and
Bandiera (2003) or where countries face a trade-oﬀ among diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency
as in Caselli and Coleman (2004) would go a long way in aiding our understanding
of how institutions inﬂuence productivity and eﬃciency.
We leave many other unanswered questions. Most glaringly, why do some countries
fail to protect property rights given that both owners of physical and human capital
gain from better institutions? We do not doubt that the answer is that some people
in these countries would lose if property rights were protected. While it may seem
plausible to say “The ruling elite would lose and therefore prevents change”, it is an
uninformative truism. This merely puts a name on the answer without providing any
way of identifying these people or how they would be aﬀected.
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36Table 1

















(0.140) (0.138) (0.249) (0.189) (0.238) (0.179)







(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.043) (0.050) (0.044)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.124 0.008 0.089 0.034 -0.070 0.026
(0.096) (0.140) (0.102) (0.109) (0.147) (0.109)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.080 0.072 0.078 0.041 0.031 0.043
(0.081) (0.095) (0.079) (0.082) (0.108) (0.084)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.008 -0.016 -0.011 -0.026 -0.037 -0.027




(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert -0.107 -0.144 -0.085 0.008 0.037 0.031
(0.081) (0.156) (0.103) (0.101) (0.150) (0.113)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.058 0.318 -0.030 0.092 0.261 0.128
(0.424) (0.544) (0.446) (0.421) (0.464) (0.427)
Fraction of Population with Malaria  -0.144
b -0.206 -0.121 -0.097 -0.137 -0.074






(0.412) (0.667) (0.406) (0.118) (0.225) (0.149) (0.632) (0.988) (0.647)
R-squared 0.73 0.55 0.73 0.71 0.48 0.71 0.75 0.58 0.75
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 1 (Cont’d)












(-0.124) (-0.147) (-0.145) (-0.155) (-0.165) (-0.175)
Democracy 0.196 -0.039 0.355
b 0.069 0.253 0.042
(0.119) (0.132) (0.167) (0.149) (0.175) (0.162)





(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Fraction of Land Near Coast -0.029 -0.057 -0.020 -0.069 -0.121 -0.074
(0.108) (0.118) (0.110) (0.120) (0.127) (0.121)
Landlocked Dummy Variable -0.073 -0.076 -0.073 -0.128 -0.133
c -0.126
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 -0.028 -0.033 -0.028
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)




(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert  -0.097 -0.107 -0.076 -0.018 -0.002 -0.004
(0.067) (0.107) (0.086) (0.082) (0.121) (0.103)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.201 0.011 -0.173 -0.238 -0.152 -0.217
(0.365) (0.372) (0.367) (0.332) (0.326) (0.350)
Fraction of Population with Malaria 0.098 0.077 0.122 0.126 0.108 0.139
(0.085) (0.111) (0.096) (0.085) (0.113) (0.102)
Constant 0.428 1.133





(0.364) (0.369) (0.367) (0.111) (0.144) (0.135) (0.622) (0.578) (0.626)
R-squared 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.33
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 2
Effect of the United Kingdom’s Geography and Institutions on Productivities
Estimates by Quintile Based on OLS Estimates
Bottom Quintile Fourth Quintile Middle Quintile Second Quintile Top Quintile
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Labor Productivity
     Productivity with UK's Institutions 69.37 71.37 79.54 78.76 91.70
     Productivity with UK's Geography  33.77 34.17 49.58 67.12 95.96
     Actual Labor Productivity 2.98 6.44 17.35 47.84 108.00
Capital Productivity
     Productivity with UK's Institutions 71.85 71.75 76.19 76.00 78.77
     Productivity with UK's Geography  46.38 52.71 51.67 63.14 65.84
     Actual Capital Productivity 22.79 35.37 47.78 67.56 95.13Table 3

















(1.033) (1.014) (0.671) (0.565) (0.755) (0.638)
Proximity to Large Markets -0.006 0.002 0.017 -0.053 -0.173
b -0.06
(0.054) (0.120) (0.067) (0.066) (0.086) (0.067)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.107 -0.442 -0.099 0.062 -0.210 -0.025
(0.108) (0.347) (0.269) (0.120) (0.198) (0.141)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.080 0.047 0.068 0.055 0.086 0.074
(0.087) (0.179) (0.100) (0.094) (0.148) (0.095)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.011 -0.057 -0.028 -0.025 -0.067
c -0.041
(0.020) (0.048) (0.031) (0.023) (0.039) (0.027)
Latitude -0.002 0.003
c -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert  0.028 0.389 0.240 0.081 0.582
c 0.307
(0.152) (0.329) (0.226) (0.142) (0.345) (0.239)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.136 0.808 0.162 0.136 1.044 0.498
(0.582) (0.904) (0.636) (0.567) (0.968) (0.647)
Fraction of Population with Malaria 0.014 0.379 0.241 0.015 0.439 0.232
(0.112) (0.306) (0.211) (0.103) (0.312) (0.211)
Constant -0.643 -0.233 -0.735 -0.945
a -1.077
b -1.274
a -0.089 1.245 -0.133
(0.680) (1.311) (0.774) (0.256) (0.534) (0.365) (0.871) (1.163) (0.874)
R-squared 0.70 0.64 0.19 0.70 0.27
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 3 (Cont’d)












(0.381) (0.693) (0.352) (0.421) (0.374) (0.472)
Democracy 0.811 -0.534 0.786
c 0.063 0.621 -0.241
-0.626 -0.970 -0.470 -0.501 -0.513 -0.598
Proximity to Large Markets 0.032 0.005 0.018 -0.080 -0.155
a -0.078
(0.057) (0.073) (0.064) (0.065) (0.058) (0.062)
Fraction of Land Near Coast -0.041 -0.217 0.085 -0.056 -0.155 -0.029
(0.114) (0.210) (0.257) (0.118) (0.134) (0.132)
Landlocked Dummy Variable -0.074 -0.084 -0.066 -0.121 -0.119 -0.127
(0.092) (0.109) (0.095) (0.092) (0.101) (0.089)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.016 -0.030 -0.005 -0.027 -0.041 -0.023
(0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) (0.025)
Latitude -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005
b -0.005
b
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert -0.044 0.060 -0.025 0.016 0.132 -0.057
(0.143) (0.231) (0.201) (0.139) (0.234) (0.224)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.233 0.164 -0.206 -0.218 0.039 -0.334
(0.546) (0.634) (0.565) (0.557) (0.657) (0.606)
Fraction of Population with Malaria 0.161 0.260 0.181 0.177 0.248 0.107
(0.105) (0.215) (0.187) (0.101)* (0.212) (0.198)
Constant -0.012 0.487 0.044 -0.126 -0.041 -0.154 1.011 1.967
b 1.025
(0.716) (0.795) (0.740) (0.240) (0.374) (0.324) (0.855) (0.790) (0.819)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 4

















(0.104) (0.061) (0.139) (0.087) (0.136) (0.083)





(0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.084) (0.074) (0.085)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.1 0.059 0.098 0.093 0.042 0.091
(0.083) (0.106) (0.091) (0.067) (0.084) (0.069)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.038 0.035 0.038 0.026 0.02 0.027
(0.053) (0.058) (0.053) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042)
Logarithm of Land Area 0.023
c 0.021 0.023 0.022
c 0.017 0.022
c




b -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert  -0.087
b -0.095 -0.062 -0.048 -0.038 -0.041
(0.042) (0.082) (0.049) (0.078) (0.094) (0.076)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert 0.176 0.408 0.209 -0.016 0.063 -0.006
(0.280) (0.358) (0.273) (0.221) (0.252) (0.227)
Fraction of Population with Malaria 0.004 -0.017 0.032 0.035 0.009 0.041




a 0.371 1.235 0.365
(0.226) (0.293) (0.226) (0.082) (0.108) (0.104) (0.838) (0.745) (0.851)
R-squared 0.63 0.53 0.63 0.57 0.39 0.57 0.64 0.54 0.64
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 4 (Cont’d)

















-0.131 -0.100 -0.223 -0.200 -0.216 -0.200







(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.036) (0.044) (0.036)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.110 -0.004 0.068 0.007 -0.091 -0.004
(0.093) (0.134) (0.099) (0.107) (0.141) (0.107)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.094 0.086 0.091 0.046 0.038 0.049
(0.080) (0.094) (0.078) (0.080) (0.103) (0.082)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.005 -0.013 -0.009 -0.025 -0.035 -0.027






(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert -0.116 -0.146 -0.092 -0.008 0.027 0.022
(0.073) (0.138) (0.092) (0.089) (0.134) (0.103)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.040 0.313 -0.008 0.078 0.244 0.124
(0.410) (0.518) (0.423) (0.409) (0.442) (0.407)
Fraction of Population with Malaria  -0.139
b -0.191 -0.113 -0.101 -0.128 -0.071








(0.385) (0.630) (0.376) (0.114) (0.202) (0.137) (0.568) (0.899) (0.581)
R-squared 0.71 0.55 0.72 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.74 0.58 0.74
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 5
















(0.803) (0.803) (0.310) (0.455) (0.461) (0.531)
Proximity to Large Markets 0.011 -0.006 0.011 -0.024 -0.132 -0.024
(0.059) (0.081) (0.053) (0.094) (0.085) (0.055)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.067 -0.310 0.065 0.130 -0.050 0.127
(0.111) (0.274) (0.213) (0.097) (0.160) (0.117)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.038 0.015 0.038 0.044 0.056 0.045
(0.068) (0.137) (0.079) (0.064) (0.083) (0.079)
Logarithm of Land Area 0.019 -0.012 0.019 0.023 -0.003 0.022
(0.019) (0.041) (0.024) (0.016) (0.037) (0.022)
Latitude 0.000 0.004
a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert  0.050 0.232
c 0.110 0.049 0.321
b 0.058
(0.083) (0.121) (0.182) (0.086) (0.157) (0.199)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert  0.096 0.709
c 0.181 0.042 0.578 0.056
(0.308) (0.391) (0.512) (0.314) (0.458) (0.538)





(0.095) (0.144) (0.169) (0.091) (0.167) (0.176)




a -0.979 0.334 -0.980
(0.728) (0.876) (0.612) (0.261) (0.239) (0.294) (1.067) (0.998) (0.727)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
Statistically significant at 1 percent is denoted by “a”, 5 percent by “b”, 10 percent by “c”.Table 5 (Cont’d)
















(0.759) (0.964) (0.399) (0.531) (0.553) (0.622)
Proximity to Large Markets -0.027 -0.013 -0.002 -0.080 -0.171
a -0.090
(0.044) (0.082) (0.063) (0.050) (0.053) (0.065)
Fraction of Land Near Coast 0.102 -0.368 -0.123 0.026 -0.220 -0.087
(0.096) (0.273) (0.255) (0.109) (0.239) (0.137)
Landlocked Dummy Variable 0.094 0.066 0.081 0.056 0.089 0.080
(0.080) (0.155) (0.095) (0.081) (0.142) (0.093)
Logarithm of Land Area -0.007 -0.046 -0.026 -0.025 -0.064 -0.045
c
-0.024 -0.057 -0.029 -0.024 -0.071 (-0.026)
Latitude -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.003
b -0.003 -0.003
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 (-0.002) -0.003 -0.002
Fraction of Land in Tropical Desert  -0.018 0.345
b 0.226 0.042 0.534
b 0.336
(0.102) (0.172) (0.213) (0.097) (0.249) (0.233)
Fraction of Land in Temperate Desert -0.096 0.765 0.247 0.108 0.972 0.579
(0.420) (0.523) (0.598) (0.420) (0.612) (0.630)
Fraction of Population with Malaria  -0.025 0.347
c 0.237 -0.024 0.407
c 0.258
(0.098) (0.184) (0.198) (0.090) (0.231) (0.206)
Constant -0.338 -0.080 -0.439 -0.759
a -0.980
a -1.138
a 0.345 1.279 0.287
(0.605) (1.008) (0.735) (0.242) (0.293) (0.343) (0.745) (1.105) (0.852)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 6: Democracy, Labor, and Capital Productivity
     
Appendix Table 1
Countries (84) Included in Empirical Analysis
Algeria Haiti Senegal
Angola Honduras Sierra Leone
Argentina Hungary Singapore
Australia India South Africa
Austria Indonesia Spain
Bangladesh Ireland Sri Lanka
Bolivia Israel Sudan
Brazil Italy Sweden
Bulgaria Ivory Coast Switzerland
Burkina Faso Jamaica Tawain
Cameroon Japan Thailand
Canada Kenya Trinidad and Tobago
Chile Korea, Rep. Tunisia
Colombia Madagascar Turkey
Congo Malawi Uganda
Congo, Democratic Republic Malaysia United Kingdom
Costa Rica Mexico United States
Denmark Morocco Uruguay
Dominican Republic Netherlands Venezuela, RB
Ecuador New Zealand Yemen, Rep.
Egypt, Arab Rep. Niger Zambia










   
Appendix Table 2
Industries (32) Included in Empirical Analysis
Industry BEA Code
Food and Kindred Products 14
Tobacco 15
Apparel 16, 17 18, 19
Pulp, Paper and Allied Products                          24, 25 
Printing and Publishing 26A, 26B
Drugs 29A
Soaps, Cleaners and Toilet Goods 29B
Agricultural Chemicals 27B
Industrial Chemicals and Synthetics 27A
Rubber and Plastic Products 32
Primary Metals  37
Non-Ferrous Metals 38
Fabricated Metals 38, 40,41,42
Farm Machines 44,45
Construction, Mining Equipment  46
Computers 51





Motor Vehicle 59A, 59b
Other Transport 60, 61
Lumber, Wood, Furniture 20, 21, 22, 23




Agriculture  01, 02, 03, 04
Mining 05, 06, 07, 09, 10
Gas/Oil 08
Construction  11, 12Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland